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di Mauro Senatore 
mauro.senatore@durham.ac.uk 
This essay traces Derrida’s interrogation of Nietzsche and Freud’s concept of 
cruelty and his attempt to think the beyond that this concept necessarily 
presupposes. On the one hand, it highlights the key traits of the Nietzschean 
and Freudian concept of cruelty, namely, its irreducibility to determination and 
its essential entanglement with life. On the other hand, it explains that the 
beyond cruelty, which Derrida thinks by dissociating life from cruelty, offers us 
the point of departure for another thinking of life as well as for the foundation of 
the right to life. 
To characterize this treatment, I would 
not use the word “cruelty”, despite the 
temptation. It’s a confused, obscure, 
overdetermined word.1 
I. 
What is cruelty? What do we mean by this strange and familiar (unheimlich) 
word? Can we determine cruelty? Are we sure that the phenomenon of non-
cruelty has not already been a dissimulated cruelty, and a relaunch? What is 
an advance in cruelty: another degree, strategy, or differential in cruelty, 
cruelty that overcomes itself? How does cruelty relate to itself? Is there a 
beyond cruelty? For example, a life without cruelty? Would this life be the 
departure point for a resistance to cruelty and the foundation of the right to 
life?  
                                                        
* This essay is the result of a research residency at the Philosophy Department of the 
University of Salerno, funded by the ACRI Young Investigator Training Program 2016. I 
thank Pina De Luca and Francesco Vitale for hosting me in Salerno and engaging in a 
generous discussion of my work. I also thank Matías Bascuñan, Victor Ibarra, Thomas 
Clément Mercier, and my students in Santiago, for their gracious comments.    
1 J. Derrida, E. Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow. A Dialogue, translated by J. Fort, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 2004, p. 64. 
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These questions are at the heart of the interrogation of the concept of 
cruelty that Jacques Derrida undertakes in two texts presented at the 
threshold of our century, in 2000, and that I will bring into focus in the pages 
that follow: Death Penalty I (1999-2000) and Psychoanalysis Searches the 
States of Its Soul: The Impossible Beyond of Cruelty (2000). In these texts, 
Derrida addresses the tradition that draws together Nietzsche’s genealogy of 
moral concepts and Freud’s meta-psychological theory of drives. Both 
Nietzsche and Freud hold on to an obscure and enigmatic concept of cruelty, 
as that which one can neither determine nor delimit, and thus whose 
possibility is the essence of life or what is most irreducible in the life of the 
living. As we will see, Derrida designates this tradition as philosophy of 
cruelty. Ultimately, both Nietzsche and Freud seem to Derrida unable to 
conceive of a beyond that is presupposed by cruelty itself, and thus of the 
necessary limits of the philosophy itself that they could elaborate.   
What do we mean by cruelty, then? This question resonates with the 
question about the meaning of pleasure that Freud raises from the outset of 
his Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Being aware that what remains 
suspended since the beginning of his investigation is the qualitative essence 
of pleasure, Freud pretends ironically to have recourse to philosophical 
tradition, which obviously has nothing to say about that essence. At this 
point, he can turn to metapsychology, namely, his economic description of 
pleasure (based on quantitative relations), as being the most complete 
representation of pleasure available at his time. He writes:  
We would readily express our gratitude to any philosophical or psychological 
theory which was able to inform us of the meaning of the feelings of pleasure and 
unpleasure [my emphasis] which act so imperatively upon us. But on this point 
we are, alas, offered nothing to our purpose. This is the most obscure and 
inaccessible region of the mind, and, since we cannot avoid contact with it, the 
least rigid hypothesis, it seems to me, will be the best. We have decided to relate 
pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of excitation […] and to relate them in 
such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of 
excitation and pleasure to a diminution.2 
                                                        
2 S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. by J. Strachey, Norton & Company, New 
York 1961, pp. 1-2. 
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Derrida does not only draw attention to this point: «nothing is said about the 
qualitative experience of pleasure itself. What is it? What does it consist of?»3. 
Above all, he recalls the opening scene of Plato’s Philebus that the evoked 
beginning of Freud’s Beyond echoes. «The inheritance is assured. Plato is 
behind Freud»4, he suggests. Derrida alludes to the beginning of Plato’s 
dialogue, when Socrates raises the question of the meaning of pleasure and 
of the different forms to which it refers. Socrates observes that the name 
“pleasure” makes us think of a unique reality, although the latter takes on 
different forms (Philebus 12b). Protarcus reacts to this observation by 
suggesting that these forms cannot be opposite and thus pleasure can only be 
identical to itself (Philebus 12b). This Platonic legacy offers Derrida the lever 
for raising once again the question about the qualitative essence of 
pleasure―that is, about the objectivity of the object and its material element, 
to put it in phenomenological terms that are not foreign to his concerns5. 
Furthermore, Derrida develops the Platonic legacy into what he had 
described elsewhere as the point of extreme obscurity and the very enigma of 
the concept of différance, that is, the articulation of economic detour and the 
relation to the absolutely other that would interrupt all economies, the 
synthesis of the economic and the aneconomic, of the same and the other6. Let 
us reread Derrida’s remarks apropos of Freud’s Socratism:  
What is pleasure? Is there a unity of the thing called pleasure? Can one give a 
proper name to such a diverse, polymorph and ungraspable phenomenon? […] 
And if pleasure were produced only by differing from itself, if it occurred only on 
this condition? […] No/step of pleasure [pas de plaisir], certainly, but if it is 
pleasure that incessantly limits itself, dealing with itself, contracting itself in 
order to prepare itself for itself, producing itself, resolving, regenerating, losing 
and keeping itself in the service of a general function of which it is the tendency, 
then, equally, there is only Pleasure.7 
                                                        
3 J. Derrida, The Postcard. From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, translated by A. Bass, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1987, p. 279. For Derrida’s analysis of 
Freud’s opening scene, see J. Derrida, The Postcard, cit., p. 276. 
4 Ivi, p. 398. 
5 For a discussion of these problems in the Husserlian phenomenology, see J. Derrida, Writing 
and Difference, translated by A. Bass, Routledge and Keagan Paul, London 1978, pp. 204-
206. 
6 Cfr. J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, translated by A. Bass, The University of Chicago 
Press, Brighton 1982, p. 19. 
7 J. Derrida, The Postcard, cit., p. 399. 
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Pleasure is always deferred, and yet there is nothing but pleasure. Pleasure 
relates to itself by limiting itself. This is how Derrida elaborates on the 
Platonic and Freudian question about the meaning and the reference of the 
obscure and enigmatic concept of pleasure. The working hypothesis of this 
article is that Derrida’s interrogation of cruelty also responds to the Socratic 
question. What is cruelty, then? What do we mean by this strange and 
familiar word? The next sections explain that Derrida finds this question at 
stake in Nietzsche’s concept of the cruelty of life as well as in Freud’s psychic 
cruelty, and that he points to their irreducible beyond.  
II.  
In Death Penalty I.6, Derrida traces the paradigm of the philosophy of cruelty 
through a close reading of the second dissertation of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of 
Morality (1887). This paradigm consists in understanding cruelty as what can 
be neither determined nor delimited, what has neither a contrary nor an 
opposable term that would put an end to it or to the opposition itself, and thus 
as what only relaunches itself by reacting against itself. An irreducible link 
between cruelty and the very life of the living is established. Derrida has 
recourse to the expression “the cruelty of life” in order to illustrate Nietzsche’s 
concept of cruelty, and, more profoundly, he attributes to it the determination 
“the essence of life,” which he had employed for his concepts of trace and 
différance almost forty years earlier8.  
Derrida takes up the following task for his reading: to shed light on the 
“logic of cruelty (torture, punishment), of the relations between the cruelty of 
life and the law” that “governs” the second dissertation9. Therefore, he 
announces from the outset that he will read Nietzsche’s treatment of cruelty 
as a philosophy of cruelty―according to which cruelty cannot be dissociated 
from life―and thus that he will trace the genealogy of the law back to the self-
                                                        
8 For an overview of Derrida’s engagement with Nietzsche throughout his work, see the 
interview “Nietzsche and the Machine” (1993) in J. Derrida, Negotiations. Interventions and 
Interviews, 1971-2001, ed. by E. Rottenberg, Stanford UP, Stanford 2002, pp. 215-256. 
9 J. Derrida, The Death Penalty. Volume I, translated by P. Kamuf, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and London 2014, pp. 125-126. 
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overcoming of cruelty. He offers the following account of this philosophy of 
cruelty:  
Since our question for the moment is also, what is cruelty? One sees unfold there 
a philosophy of cruelty, the philosophy of a cruelty that, in sum, has no contrary. 
There are to be sure differences among several modes or different degrees of 
intensity of cruelty, between an active cruelty and a reactive cruelty, but there 
is no opposition between cruelty and non-cruelty […] Life is—it owes it to itself 
to be—cruel wherever it keeps itself, wherever it keeps the memory and even, I 
will add, the truth of itself.10  
The first consequence of this concept of cruelty as the cruelty of life is that, as 
Derrida points out, «in this logic of the differential of cruelty rather than of 
the opposition between cruelty and non-cruelty, there is no true, original 
place for a debate for or against the death penalty»11, which is the focus of the 
seminar. Putting to death, he continues, is a degree or a strategy in cruelty, 
which requires one to interpret it in a non-juridical fashion «since this whole 
essay and this whole book are genealogies of law and of penal law that go 
back to movements of animal-human life […] that are older and more 
profound, more irreducible than law»12. We will return to this point. First, it 
is worth remarking that the irreducible link between cruelty and life consists 
in the implication of cruelty in what Derrida identifies as the most elementary 
process of life, that is, self-preservation, or memory. He draws an evidence of 
this implication from a passage of Genealogy II.3 that he paraphrases as 
follows: 
The question is: how to make a memory for the man-animal (Menschen-Tiere) 
[…] how to make him remember […] Nothing is more terrifying and unheimlich 
in the prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. […] It is thus indeed a history 
or rather a prehistory of cruelty: to remember, to imprint the memory, one causes 
suffering, one must cause suffering; here is where the red appears, the red of fire 
before the red of blood: a thing is applied with a red-hot iron to imprint it on the 
memory (and this whole text is written according to the figure of impression, of 
the painful inscription in the body: ‘Mann brennt etwas ein, damit es im 
Gedächtnis bleibt,’ something is burned, something is made red hot by 
penetrating until it draws blood so that it remains in memory). And Nietzsche 
specifies what is then the universal law that he wants to recall here, the law that 
links memory to pain, wound, trauma: «only that which never ceases to hurt 
                                                        
10 Ivi, 126.  
11 Ibidem. 
12 Ibidem. 
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stays in the memory [nur was nicht aufhört, wehzutun, bleibt im Gedächtnis]»—
and Nietzsche underlines wehzutun.13  
Derrida suggests that we find here the concept of cruelty (of «causing-to-suffer 
so as to remember») as «a zoological principle»14. Cruelty can no longer be 
dissociated from life (qua self-preservation) and thus constitutes «the essence 
of life, insofar as it keeps itself, insofar as, at the same time, it protects and 
keeps itself in memory in its truth»15. As anticipated, Derrida conjures up the 
determination that he had associated to trace and différance in “Freud and 
the Scene of Writing” (1966). In his early essay, these concepts are designated 
as the essence of life to the extent that life as self-keeping can only be thought 
in terms of trace or différance16. Therefore, the philosophy of cruelty that we 
found at stake in the later seminar seems to be a further elaboration of 
grammatology qua thinking of the trace as the element of life. It seems to tie 
cruelty to what is irreducible in the life of the living, that is, the trace.    
We can go back to the aforementioned consequence of the concept of 
cruelty as a zoological principle, that is, the understanding of the law in 
                                                        
13 Ivi, pp. 126-127. For Nietzsche’s text, see F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, 
translated by C. Diethe, Cambridge UP, Cambridge 2006, p. 38. Nietzsche scholarship, 
however extended and differentiated, does not read the concept of cruelty that Nietzsche 
elaborates in the second dissertation of the Genealogy as the essence of life. On the one hand, 
the cruelty of mnemotechnical practices is seen as required to breed a memorial (not-
forgetful) animal and thus to the birth of the state. On the other hand, the estrangement of 
the animal-man from its spontaneous expressions of cruelty, through the dispensation of 
punishment, is interpreted as the decisive step towards the institution of the social contract. 
See, for example, Conway 2008. Interestingly, Conway acknowledges his debt to the reading 
of cruelty developed by Deleuze and Guattari in their Antioedipus (1977). The latter claim to 
know what cruelty means by linking it to the question of creating a memory for man and 
thus demarcating it from a biological organism: «Cruelty is the movement of culture that is 
realized in bodies and inscribed on them, belaboring them. That is what cruelty means» (G. 
Deleuze, F. Guattari, Antioedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by R. Hurley, 
M. Seem, H.R. Lane, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1983, p. 145). Cfr. also ivi, 
pp. 190-192.  
14 J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 127. 
15 Ibidem. 
16 See J. Derrida, Writing and Difference, cit., pp. 254-255: «No doubt life protects itself by 
repetition, trace, différance (deferral). But we must be wary of this formulation: there is no 
life present at first which would then come to protect, postpone, or reserve itself in différance. 
The latter constitutes the essence of life. Or rather: as différance is not an essence, as it is 
not anything, it is not life, if Being is determined as ousia, presence, essence/existence, 
substance or subject. Life must be thought of as trace before Being may be determined as 
presence». In Derrida’s late writings, cruelty seems to be as irreducible as the text: one may 
almost say that il n’y a pas d’hors-cruelty (and yet there is, as we will see), as well as «il n’y 
a pas d’hors-texte» (cfr. ivi, p. 158). 
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relation to more than juridical, namely, zoological, movements. «It is an entire 
reading of history and culture, of law and religion», Derrida argues, «that 
Nietzsche submits to this natural and zoological principle». Punishment is 
not interpreted as «a juridical apparatus», but as «a movement of life, a 
writing of life so as to remember»17. According to Derrida, a philosophy of 
cruelty allows Nietzsche, in the subsequent passage from Genealogy II.3, to 
trace cultural and religious institutions (solemnities, festivals, celebrations 
and so on) back to acts of memory18.    
As the seminar develops, Derrida examines how Nietzsche accounts for 
the relationship between the cruelty of life and the law. He interprets the 
genealogy of the social contract, as it is described in Genealogy II.4-6, as an 
advance in cruelty that amounts to a movement of idealization. His analysis 
begins by recalling that a principle of equivalence constitutes the movement 
through which the drive for revenge is idealized. He paraphrases the final 
part of Genealogy II.4: 
During the longest period of human history, one did not punish because one held 
the wrongdoer to be responsible (verantwortlich, section 4, 2 [64; KSA, 298]), one 
did not acknowledge that only the guilty one should be punished. In this 
primitive humanity, which survives in us, one punished the way one punishes 
children when driven by anger. But at a given moment this anger comes to be 
contained within certain limits; it comes to be repressed and modified by the idea 
that every injury has its equivalent [Äquivalent], and that it can be compensated 
in a calculable fashion [abgezahlt werden könne], be it through some pain that 
would affect the author of the injury.19 
Derrida interprets Nietzsche’s exposition of the process of the social contract 
as the becoming-psychic and symbolization of cruelty. Nietzsche links the 
social contract, namely, the relationship between debtor and creditor, 
established through a promise, and the cruelty at work in memory. “Promises 
are made,” Nietzsche notes, “precisely here, the person making the promise 
has to have a memory made for him: precisely here, we may suppose, is a 
repository of hard, cruel, painful things [Hartes, Grausames, Peinliches]” 
(Nietzsche 2006, 40). He goes on highlighting the cruelty of the debtor-
                                                        
17 J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 127. 
18 Cfr. F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, cit., p. 38, and the explication of the text in 
J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 127. 
19 Ibidem. Cfr. F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, cit., p. 40.  
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creditor relationship. «The debtor pledges himself», Derrida summarizes, «to 
consecrate the holiness of his promise [die Heiligkeit seines Versprechens] […] 
to indemnify the creditor in case he does not pay, by giving the creditor 
something he possesses, for example his body, or his wife, or his freedom, or 
even his life [oder auch sein Leben]» (Derrida 2014, 131)20. At this point, 
Nietzsche introduces the jus talionis as the progress made by Roman law in 
the history of the social contract21. This progress, which amounts to 
establishing a principle of equivalence between injury and the price to be 
paid, secures the compensation of the creditor with the psychic enjoyment 
that derives from causing the debtor to suffer. It thus entails the foundation 
of the right to domination and cruelty. Derrida has the following paraphrasis 
of the second part of the section:   
In place of an advantage that compensates (as Rückzahlung, as equal and 
accountable compensation in return) in the form of something or someone, a wife, 
for example, or a good, a thing, a body, the creditor is granted a psychic 
reimbursement, as it were, psychic or symbolic […] he will be given some 
pleasure, some enjoyment [jouissance], a feeling of well-being or of a greater well-
being [Wohlgefühl], a pleasure that consists in the voluptuous pleasure of 
causing the other to suffer, and cruelly […] In place of some equivalent, 
something or someone, one grants in return, as payment, the pleasure of doing 
violence [Genuss in der Verge-waltigung], “la jouissance de faire violence”, as the 
French translation has it; I would also say the pleasure taken, the enjoying [le 
jouir] that has to do with exercising power (Gewalt), and here even with 
exercising one’s sovereignty over the debtor—man or woman. This is the 
foundation of what Nietzsche in concluding section 5 calls a “right to cruelty 
[Anrecht auf Grausamkeit]”.22 
This passage brings to light a structural link between power, violence, and 
sovereignty, on the one hand, and pleasure, enjoyment, and cruelty, on the 
other hand. As Derrida points out, the foundation of power and sovereignty 
merges with the becoming psychic of cruelty. In the subsequent section of 
Genealogy (II.6), Nietzsche concludes that the origin of morals is cruelty and 
thus even the categorical imperative of Kant must be retraced to this origin. 
«May we not add that this world [the moral conceptual world]», Nietzsche 
                                                        
20 Cfr. F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, cit., pp. 40-41.  
21 For Derrida’s reading of the jus talionis in the Kantian moral and legal philosophy, see G. 
Bennington, “Ex Lex”, The Oxford Literary Review, 35/2, 2013, pp. 143-163.  
22 J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 132. Cfr. F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morality, 
cit., p. 41. 
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writes, «has really never quite lost a certain odour of blood and torture? (not 
even with old Kant: the categorical imperative smells of cruelty)»23. Hence, 
Derrida deduces that the genealogy of morals, including the moral world of 
Kant, is a theatre of cruelty24. However, within the paradigm of this 
philosophy of cruelty, further advance in the sphere of legal and moral 
obligations can always be reinscribed into the differential logic of cruelty. 
Derrida puts this consequence to the test by taking account of Beccaria’s 
discourse against the death penalty and in favor of a life sentence of hard 
labor. «One can always interpret Beccaria’s proposal as still more cruel than 
the still more cruel proposal of Kant, more cruel, then, than the death 
penalty», he observes, since for Beccaria this «will make the criminal suffer 
more»25. A reaction against cruelty is just another strategy in cruelty, which 
allows cruelty to overcome itself.26  
III. 
Bringing his analysis of Nietzsche’s Genealogy to an end, Derrida designates 
the concept of cruelty that he has brought into light as “originary”. For this 
reason, «it has no contrary», and «the phenomenon of non-cruelty, the 
appearance of non-cruelty would be but a dissimulated cruelty, or even a bid 
to raise the level of cruelty»27. This conclusion allows Derrida to link 
Nietzsche and Freud’s responses to the question about the meaning of cruelty: 
on the one hand, the cruelty of life and its relationship with the law, on the 
other hand, sadism and destructive drives. Therefore, for a further 
development of the analyses undertaken in Death Penalty I.6, he suggests, a 
patient examination of Freud’s work in the wake of “originary cruelty, 
originary sadism” is required28. This reference consists in a programme of 
reading that remains undeveloped. This section will unpack the key moments 
                                                        
23 Ibidem. 
24 On the Kantian theatre of cruelty, see J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 134. 
25 Ivi, p. 136. 
26 For the examination of Beccaria’s discourse within the Nietzschean framework of the 
philosophy of cruelty, see ivi, p. 136, and R. Trumbull, “Derrida and the Death Penalty: The 
Question of Cruelty”, Philosophy Today, 2015, 59/2, pp. 327-328.  
27 J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 135. 
28 Ibidem. 
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of this programme that underlie Derrida’s interpretation of the Freudian 
concept of cruelty.   
Firstly, Derrida proposes following the traces of sadism throughout 
Freud’s work («in particular the Freud of Three Essays, of “Drives and Their 
Vicissitudes”, or of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “The Economic Problem of 
Masochism”»). In so doing, we would discover the element of cruelty, that is, 
the “reflexive middle voice” of causing-to-suffer: «“to make oneself suffer” 
whether by oneself or by the other»29. In the first work mentioned by Derrida, 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud explains that «the most 
common and the most significant of all the perversions – the desire to inflict 
pain upon the sexual object, and its reverse, received [the names of sadism 
and masochism] from Krafft-Ebing […] for its active and passive forms 
respectively»30. Furthermore, he notes that the alternative name “algolagnia” 
reminds us of the relationship between these perversions and cruelty (here 
understood as a passive voice): «this emphasizes the pleasure in pain, 
cruelty». Sadism is defined as «an aggressive and violent attitude towards the 
sexual object», from which masochism is derived when the subject’s self «takes 
the place of the object itself»31. Finally, in the subsequent remarks, Freud 
recalls a suggestive thesis that links sadism to the cannibalism that is 
implicit in the drive for mastery. «According to some authorities», he points 
out, «this aggressive element of the sexual drive is in reality a relic of 
cannibalistic desires―that is, it is a contribution derived from the apparatus 
for obtaining mastery»32.  
In the later “Drives and Their Vicissitudes” (1915), Freud further 
elaborates the relationship between sadism and masochism. He suggests that 
the active voice of sadism passes into a reflexive form in which «the object is 
given up and replaced by the subject’s self», and a passive voice in which «an 
extraneous person is once more sought as object» who «has to take over the 
role of the subject»33. It is likely that this reflexive voice provides Derrida with 
                                                        
29 Ibidem. 
30 S. Freud, Complete Works, translated by J. Strachey, Ivan Smith Edition, 1956-1974, p. 
1484. 
31 Ibidem. 
32 Ivi, p. 1485. 
33 Ivi, p. 2964. 
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a resource for his hypothesis about a reflexive making-suffer, which 
constitutes the concept of the cruelty of life (namely, cruelty as the essence of 
that life which makes itself suffer to preserve itself).  
In the latest texts mentioned by Derrida in his programme of reading, 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and “The Economic Problem of 
Masochism” (1925), Freud places sadism within the framework of his theory 
of drives. He supposes that sadism constitutes the form that the death drive 
takes on when it enters the service of the sexual drive and, more generally, 
when it contrasts erotic and conservative drives. In Chapter VI of Beyond, 
Freud writes:   
From the very first we recognized the presence of a sadistic component in the 
sexual drive […] But how can the sadistic drive, whose aim is to injure the object, 
be derived from Eros, the preserver of life? Is it not plausible to suppose that this 
sadism is in fact a death drive which, under the influence of the narcissistic 
libido, has been forced away from the ego and has consequently only emerged in 
relation to the object?34 
Furthermore, in a note added to this chapter in 1921, a note in which he 
summarizes the chronological stages of his theory of drives, Freud explains 
that his speculation has traced the dualism of erotic and destructive drives 
back to the dualism of life and death drives35. “The Economic Problem of 
Masochism” further develops this relationship between sadism and 
destructive drives. Here Freud draws together “destructive drives”, “drive for 
mastery”, and “the will to power”, and describes sadism as the “portion” of 
these drives that «is directly placed under the service of the sexual function» 
(Freud 1956-1974, pp. 4075-4076).  
                                                        
34 S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, cit., pp. 47-48. For Derrida’s reference to this 
passage, see J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 135. In “To Speculate on Freud”, Derrida 
notes: «Apparently, it [sadism] would render service to monistic Jungianism by dissimulating 
itself in its libidinal form. Apparently it would disserve the dualist cause, and this is why it 
must be restored to its essential nature, and its authentic origin: eigentlich eines Todestrieb» 
(J. Derrida, The Postcard, cit., p. 368). 
35 Cfr. S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, cit., p. 55: «The opposition between the ego-
instincts and the sexual instincts was transformed into one between the ego-instincts and 
the object-instincts, both of a libidinal nature. But in its place a fresh opposition appeared 
between the libidinal (ego- and object-) instincts and others, which must be presumed to be 
present in the ego and which may perhaps actually be observed in the destructive instincts. 
Our speculations have transformed this opposition into one between the life instincts (Eros) 
and the death instincts». On this point, see R. Trumbull, “Derrida and the Death Penalty”, 
cit., p. 323. 
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Secondly, Derrida refers to the analysis of «the drive to dominate [pulsion 
d’emprise]» [Bemächtigung, Bewältigung] and of «its relation to love life and 
[…] sadomasochism» (p. 135), which he had undertaken in “To Speculate—on 
‘Freud’”36. In this text, he explains that the drive for domination 
[Bemächtigungstrieb] consists in a process of binding and mastering that is 
preliminary and independent from the mastery of the pleasure principle37. 
This drive constitutes the element or the essence of the drive in general to the 
extent that it accounts for the drive’s self-relation: 
One can envisage, then, a quasi-transcendental privilege of this drive for 
mastery, drive for power, or drive for domination [emprise]. The latter 
denomination seems preferable: it marks more clearly the relation to the other, 
even in domination over oneself […] The drive to dominate must also be the 
drive’s relation to itself: there is no drive not driven to bind itself to itself and to 
assure itself of mastery over itself as a drive. Whence the transcendental 
tautology of the drive to dominate: it is the drive as drive, the drive of the drive, 
the driveness of the drive.38 
Derrida explains that this quasi-transcendental drive also makes sadism 
possible. Following the entry on Bemächtigungstrieb in Laplanche and 
Pontalis’s The Language of Psychoanalysis (1967), he remarks that «a violent 
exercise of power or domination» (Bewältigung) is at work in sadism that 
«Laplanche and Pontalis relate precisely [justement] to Bemächtigung»39.  
IV. 
It is time to open “Psychoanalysis Searches the Sates of its Soul: The 
Impossible Beyond of Cruelty”. In this text, Derrida does not only develop the 
suggestion of drawing together Nietzsche and Freud’s concept of cruelty. 
Taking Freud’s text as the point of departure for his analysis, he aims to a 
beyond this obscure and enigmatic concept of cruelty, and thus to another life 
                                                        
36 For an excellent overview of “To Speculate on Freud”, see F. Vitale, “La vita la morte”, in 
S. Facioni, S. Regazzoni, F. Vitale, Derridario. Dizionario della decostruzione, Il Melangolo, 
Genova 2012, pp. 106-117. 
37 For Freud’s account of Bemächtigungstrieb as a drive that operates before and 
independently from the pleasure principle, see S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, cit., 
pp. 10, 26, 29, and J. Derrida, The Postcard, cit., pp. 325, 350-351.  
38 Ivi, p. 403. 
39 Ivi, p. 404. Cfr. J. Laplanche, J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, translated 
by D. Nicholson-Smith, The Hogarth Press, London 1973, pp. 217-218. 
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or something other than life, a life without cruelty, the beyond of the life 
whose essence is cruelty. The pages that follow focus on this task, which 
Derrida has announced since the title of his essay.  
The opening scene still echoes the beginning of the Philebus: saying 
«cruelly», Derrida remarks, we act «as if we understood ourselves and agreed 
with one another as to what “cruel” means»40. What is cruelty, then? What do 
we mean by that? Once more, Derrida evokes the proper names of Nietzsche 
and Freud, their concept of cruelty, and the differential logic by which cruelty 
relates to itself by overcoming itself.  
In all these cases cruelty would be difficult to determine or delimit. Nietzsche, 
for example, sees there the cunning essence of life: cruelty would be without limit 
and without opposable term, thus endless and without contrary. But for Freud, 
who is nevertheless so close to Nietzsche, as always, cruelty might perhaps be 
without limit but not without opposable term, that is, endless but not without 
contrary―this will be one of our questions. One can staunch bloody cruelty 
(cruor, crudus, crudelitas), one can put an end to murder by blade, by the 
guillotine, in the classical or modern theaters of bloody war, but, according to 
Nietzsche or Freud, a psychic cruelty will always take its place by inventing new 
resources.41 
This passage draws attention to a shift between Nietzsche and Freud’s 
concepts of cruelty. As we will see, the latter admits a contrary of cruelty or 
an opposable term (namely, eros and erotic drives) that, however, puts an end 
neither to cruelty nor to its self-overcoming. Therefore, he does not break with 
the concept of cruelty and its differential logic. Conversely, Derrida sheds 
light on the necessary beyond of cruelty and life (qua self-preservation) that 
would offer another ground for resisting cruelty and founding the right to life.  
The essay starts with a twofold hypothesis on the relationship between the 
concept of cruelty and psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis constitutes first a 
                                                        
40 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, ed. by P. Kamuf, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002, p. 
238. On the obscurity of the concept of cruelty, see also ivi, pp. 262-263, and S. Morgan 
Wortham, “Survival of Cruelty”, in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2013, 51, pp. 125-
127.  
41 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., p. 239. The reference to “invention” in this passage resonates 
with the following passage from the Death Penalty seminar: «Even when the death penalty 
will have been abolished, when it will have been purely and simply, absolutely and 
unconditionally, abolished on earth, it will survive; there will still be some death penalty. 
Other figures will be found for it; other figures will be invented for it, other turns in the 
condemnation to death» (J. Derrida, The Death Penalty, cit., p. 227). On the question of 
invention in the Death Penalty seminar, see R. Mendoza-de Jesús, “Invention of the Death 
Penalty: Abolitionism at its Limits”, in The Oxford Literary Review, 2013, 35/2, pp. 221-240. 
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privileged way of approaching the concept of cruelty: as Derrida puts it, it 
opens up «the only way» that would allow us «to interrogate what might be 
meant by this strange and familiar word “cruelty”»42. By consequence, no 
other discourse can account for cruelty as something whose possibility is 
«irreducible in the life of the living», without «reducing its meaning»43, its 
resistance to determination/delimitation and its indissociability from life. In 
other words, Derrida continues, without psychoanalysis we would be unable 
to seriously engage with «something like psychical cruelty» and «something 
like the mere self-relation of cruelty» (its self-overcoming). Ultimately, he 
evokes «a psychoanalytic revolution» as necessary to take up «the task of 
taking account of the grammatical syntax, conjugations, reflexivities, and 
persons»44 through which the meaning of cruelty remains the same. This 
revolutionary discourse would be able to account for the new forms that 
cruelty keeps on inventing by overcoming itself45. 
 Before putting his hypothesis to the test through the analysis of 
Freud’s concept of cruelty, Derrida raises a question about the limits of this 
concept. The possibility of this question resides precisely within the 
framework of a philosophy of cruelty, that is, of the concept of cruelty as that 
to which one cannot put an end and thus as the cruelty of life. Derrida points 
to a beyond cruelty, a life without cruelty, from within Nietzsche and Freud’s 
elaborations of cruelty, that is, a beyond presupposed by their very concept of 
cruelty. Therefore, if, for Freud, the possibility of cruelty, qua sadism and 
destructive drives, cannot be dissociated from the life of the living and this 
possibility is linked to the beyond of the pleasure principle, that is, to the 
death drive and the drive for domination, Derrida wonders if there is a beyond 
that beyond and thus a beyond Freud’s discourse on drives. He formulates 
this question as follows:    
Is there, for thought, for psychoanalytic thought to come, another beyond, if I 
can say that, a beyond that would stand beyond these possibles that are still both 
                                                        
42 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., p. 239. 
43 Ivi, pp. 239-240. 
44 Ivi, p. 240. 
45 On Derrida’s twofold hypothesis, see E. Rottenberg, “Derrida and Psychoanalysis”, in A 
Companion to Derrida, ed. by Z. Direk and L. Lawlor, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester 2014, 
pp. 314-317.  
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the pleasure and reality principles and the death or sovereign mastery drives, 
which seem to be at work wherever cruelty is on the horizon? In other words, 
altogether other words, can one think this apparently impossible, but otherwise 
impossible thing, namely, a beyond the death drive or the drive for sovereign 
mastery, thus the beyond of a cruelty, a beyond that would have nothing to do 
with either drives or principles? And thus nothing to do either with all the rest 
of the Freudian discourse […] especially with what Freud, as we will hear, also 
calls its ‘mythology of the drives.46 
In the following pages of the text, Derrida takes the correspondence between 
Einstein and Freud, collected under the title Why War? (1932), as his source 
for analyzing Freud’s concept of cruelty at the same time as for responding to 
the question about its limits. He will delimit and make that concept tremble 
from within, by demonstrating that there must be a beyond cruelty and thus 
by opening a discourse other than Freud’s theory of drives.  
Einstein starts the exchange by formulating the problem: «is there any 
way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?»47. He is confident that 
Freud will «bring the light of his far-reaching knowledge of man’s drive life to 
bear upon the problem», so long as «psychological obstacles»48 are at stake 
here. The only solution to the problem is, for Einstein, the institution of an 
international court, «a legislative and judicial body», that would «settle every 
conflict arising between nations»49. This institution would require the 
«unconditional surrender by every nation, in a certain measure, of its liberty 
of action, that is to say, its sovereignty [Souveränität]»50. But here all 
difficulties begin: «strong psychological factors [mächtige psychologische 
Kräfte]», as Einstein puts it, contrast this solution. «The craving for power 
[Machtbedürfnis] which characterizes the governing class in every nation», 
he explains, «is hostile to any limitation of the national sovereignty»51. The 
same psychological factors also explain how this minority succeeds in leading 
the rest of the nation to undertake wars («rousing man to such a wild 
                                                        
46 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., p. 241. For the irreducible relationship between cruelty and 
the beyond of the pleasure principle (death drive and drive for mastery), see ivi, pp. 257-258. 
47 A. Einstein, S. Freud, Why War?, translated by S. Gilber, League of Nations 1933, p. 12. 
Einstein adds that this is «a matter of life and death for civilization», given the progress of 
science and technology in his time (ibidem). 
48 Ivi, p. 13. 
49 Ivi, p. 14. 
50 Ivi, p. 15. 
51 Ivi, p. 16. 
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enthusiasm, even to sacrifice their lives [my emphasis]»). This minority 
awakens and stimulates «man’s lust for hatred and destruction». Here 
Einstein finds «an enigma that only an expert in the lore of human drives», 
such as his addressee, «can resolve» 52. Commenting on this passage, Derrida 
highlights the lexical and theoretical resonance between the strong 
psychological factors evoked by Einstein and the Freudian theory of drives, a 
resonance that is developed in Freud’s response. According to Derrida, 
Einstein singles out the link between drive for power and cruelty that is a key 
feature of the Freudian theory: 
Despite the ingenuousness that Freud attributes to him as regards things of the 
psyche, Einstein advances at this point a hypothesis that anticipates the 
direction of what will be Freud’s reply, namely, that of a cruelty drive (that is, 
basically a death drive [my emphasis]), which, without being reduced to it, is 
coupled with the drive for power [Bemächtigungstrieb] that has such an original 
place in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle”.53 
Anticipating Freud’s response, Derrida translates the problem raised by 
Einstein into a question concerning the possibilities of a progressive politics 
and legislation within the differential logic of cruelty. «What could one do with 
an irreducible death drive and an invincible drive for power»54, Derrida 
wonders. In other words, if cruelty relates to itself by overcoming itself and 
thus if it has already been at work in political and legal institutions, how can 
we ground a resistance to cruelty and the right to life?  
In his response to Einstein, Freud recalls the economy of drives that he 
had exposed in Chapter VI of Beyond. A dualism of love and hate governs this 
economy. On the one hand, we have erotic or sexual drives (“those that 
conserve and unify”55), on the other hand, aggressive and destructive drives 
(«drives to destroy and kill»56). According to Freud’s text, not only is there no 
end for this dualism but, more profoundly, the latter can be read as the self-
relation of cruelty. In fact, Freud acknowledges that it is difficult to 
disentangle conservative from destructive drives and vice versa: «Each of 
                                                        
52 Ivi, p. 18. 
53 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., p. 252. 
54 Ibidem. 
55 A. Einstein, S. Freud, Why War?, cit., p. 40. 
56 Ivi, p. 41. 
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these drives is as indispensable as its opposite and all phenomena of life 
derive from their activity, whether they work in concert or in opposition»57. 
For example, the drive for self-preservation needs the drive for destruction to 
attain its ends, whereas, in the case of war, the release of destructive drives 
is facilitated by the appeal to the erotic ones.58 Furthermore, Freud explicitly 
affirms the link between sadism, cruelty and the death drive. He describes 
the genesis of the destructive drive by appealing to the genesis of originary 
sadism: the death drive «becomes an impulse to destroy when», he observes, 
«it directs its action outwards, against external objects». In other words, «the 
living being […] defends its own existence [according to the sexual and erotic 
drives] by destroying foreign bodies»59.  
The economy exposed here does not seem to leave room for a progressive 
politics and legislation, to return to Einstein’s question. Freud thus concludes 
that, in his “mythology of drives”, «there is no likehood of our being able to 
suppress humanity’s aggressive tendencies»60. His mythology is finally a 
philosophy of cruelty. However, within these limits, it allows an indirect way 
to contrast cruelty. «If the propensity for war be due to the destructive drive», 
he observes, then «we have always its counter-agent, Eros, to our hand». Eros 
contrasts war by producing «ties of sentiment»61. Cruelty can be opposed only 
indirectly, precisely because erotic drives require aggressive drives to affirm 
themselves. One thus can put an end neither to destructive drives nor to the 
dualism love/hate. It is from this perspective that Derrida traces Freud’s 
solution to Einstein’s problem back to the philosophy of cruelty found at work 
in Nietzsche’s Genealogy. «Freud thinks, like the Nietzsche of Genealogy of 
                                                        
57 Ibidem. 
58 Cfr. ivi, pp. 42, 44. 
59 Ivi, p. 45. On the role played by the concept of cruelty in Freud’s response, Derrida observes: 
«Not that the sense of the word “cruelty” [Grausamkeit] is clear, but it plays an indispensable 
operative role, and that is why I make it bear all the weight of the question. Having recourse 
more than once to this word, Freud reinscribes it in a psychoanalytic logic of destructive 
drives indissociable from the death drive. He alludes more than once to the “lust for 
aggression and destruction” [Die Lust an der Aggression und Destruktion], to the “countless 
cruelties in history” [ungezählte Grausamkeiten der Geschichte], to the “atrocities of the past” 
[Gräueltaten der Geschichte], to the “cruelties of the Inquisition” [Grausamkeiten der 
Inquisition]» (J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., pp. 269-270). 
60 A. Einstein, S. Freud, Why War?, cit., p. 41. 
61 Ivi, p. 48. 
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Morals, that cruelty has no contrary, that it is tied to the essence of life and 
the will to power»62. Freud operates a displacement within the Nietzschean 
paradigm of philosophy of cruelty by introducing a contrary or an opposable 
term for cruelty. At the same time, he does not break with cruelty nor with 
that paradigm, since the contrary of cruelty, Eros, neither designates a 
beyond cruelty nor opens up a new discourse on life. Therefore, Derrida 
reformulates Freud’s solution as follows:   
Indirection, the rise of the detour [Umweg], consists, to put it too succinctly (but 
this is not the essential thing that concerns me here), in bringing into play the 
antagonistic force of Eros, love and the love of life, against the death drive. There 
is thus a contrary to the cruelty drive, even if the latter knows no end. There is 
an opposable term, even if there is not a term that puts an end to the opposition. 
This indirect stratagem of the antagonism between Thanatos and Eros operates 
in two ways, that is, by cultivating two sorts of ties, which are emotional ties.63  
As Derrida points out, Freud demarcates psychological discourse, as a 
mythology of drives, from the ethical, the juridical and the political, and finds 
in the former the foundation of a progressive politics. In so doing, he revises 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of cruelty and yet remains within its logic. On the one 
hand, Freud acknowledges that destructive drives cannot be dissociated from 
life and thus from conservative and life drives; on the other hand, he holds on 
to conservative and life drives in view of eradicating cruelty and thus 
founding the right to life. In other words, he founds a resistance to destructive 
drives within his mythology. For Freud, an ambiguous concept of 
life―«organic life»64, as Derrida puts it―motivates the right to life65. Derrida 
finds in the revision that the Nietzschean tradition undergoes here the 
ultimate step of the philosophy of cruelty and of its relation to the law:   
At the very point at which he recalls that there is […] no sense in wanting to rid 
oneself of the destructive drives, without which life itself would cease, Freud 
continues […] to find in life, in organic life, in the self-protective economy of 
organic life, and thus in one of the poles of the polarity, the roots of the whole 
                                                        
62 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., p. 271. 
63 Ibidem. 
64 Ivi, p. 274. 
65 Cfr. A. Einstein, S. Freud, Why War?, p. 53: «We are pacifists», Freud explains, since «our 
organic nature wills us thus to be». 
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ethico-political rationality […]. It is thus by life, by organic life, that he justifies 
the right to life.66  
Here we touch upon the very limits of Nietzsche and Freud’s concept of 
cruelty: a thinking of life as merely organic and conservative. Life cannot be 
dissociated from the possibility of cruelty and thus it grounds a resistance to 
cruelty that is endless and can be read as the self-overcoming of cruelty67. At 
this point, Derrida opens onto a beyond cruelty and the cruelty of life, at the 
same time as onto a beyond the philosophy of cruelty (Nietzsche’s genealogy 
as well as Freud’s mythology of drives). He points to a life that is without 
cruelty, since it accounts for the unconditional exposure (a yes) to the to-come 
(the other or time), and that, by its very definition, cruelty requires in order 
to relate to itself. This life constitutes the ultimate lever for thinking life as 
well as for founding the right to life. Derrida calls it “survival”: 
Well, I will affirm that there is, it is indeed necessary that there be reference to 
some unconditional, an unconditional without sovereignty, and thus without 
cruelty, which is no doubt a very difficult thing to think […]. It is necessary for 
this economic and symbolic conditionality to constitute itself. It is attached to a 
life, certainly, but to a life other than that of the economy of the possible, an im-
possible life no doubt, a sur-vival, not symbolizable, but the only one that is 
worthy of being lived, without alibi, once and for all, the only one from which to 
depart (notice I say from which to depart) for a possible thinking of life.68  
In this passage, Derrida distances himself from Freud’s elaboration of a 
contrary of cruelty that would justify our resistance to cruelty and the right 
to life. This is not because, in so doing, Freud betrays the legacy of Nietzsche 
but, rather, because he does not transgress the latter and keeps on affirming 
the differential logic of cruelty69. On the other hand, this does not mean that 
                                                        
66 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., p. 274. 
67 For a different reading of Eros, see S. Morgan Wortham, “Survival of Cruelty”, cit., pp. 135-
137. The author interprets the Freudian dualism of cruelty and eros as the endpoint of 
Derrida’s interrogation of cruelty and does not take into account the latter’s thinking of a 
beyond cruelty.  
68 J. Derrida, Without Alibi, cit., p. 274. On the figure of survival in the Death Penalty 
seminar, see R. Mendoza-de Jesús, “Invention of the Death Penalty”, cit., pp. 236-237. As we 
saw, here survival designates life without cruelty, which Mendoza-de Jesús links only to a 
traditional resistance to cruelty.  
69 Trumbull suggests that Derrida finds in Freud’s concept of cruelty, as irreducibly attached 
to life, a key source for his understanding of life as finitude and exposure to death. Therefore, 
by affirming a pacifism based on erotic and conservative drives, Freud would overlook the 
potential in his concept of cruelty (cfr. R. Trumbull “Derrida and the Death Penalty”, cit., pp. 
333-334). On our reading, Freud unfolds the relationship between destructive and 
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the beyond of life discovered by Derrida merely frees a resistance to cruelty 
that has no relation with cruelty itself. Rather, Derrida conceives of the 
relation between survival and that resistance in terms of negotiation. The 
former «cannot be made into a task», but we can «come to terms» and 
«negotiate» with it. 
 
                                                        
conservative drives within his mythological discourse, beyond which Derrida points when 
thinking of a life without cruelty.  
